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   Abstract 
 
Do state growth management programs protect marginal environmental lands, and just as 
importantly, how would we know if they did?  We evaluate growth management in 
Florida by using a regional adjustment model to explain changes in population and 
employment densities in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Tennessee during three five-year periods spanning 1982 through 1997.  
This paper innovates by showing how adjustment models provide a framework for testing 
the impact of land use regulation, allowing us to test the hypothesis that Florida’s growth 
management program changed that state’s development pattern.  Population density 
changes in Florida counties are significantly different from the rest of the Atlantic 
Southeast.  Within Florida, counties that were early growth management compliers had 
significantly different population growth patterns. The evidence suggests that Florida’s 
growth management program is associated with higher population densities, and hence 
less land consumption.  The evidence during the 1992-1997 period is primarily due to 
higher density population growth in the four largest and most urbanized counties in South 
Florida’s environmentally sensitive Okeechobee Basin, which includes the Everglades.
   Urban growth has clear impacts on the environment.  The growth management movement 
in the United States had its genesis, in part, in efforts to control environmental 
externalities associated with land development (Bollens, 1993).  In recent years, scientific 
advances have increased the list of possible environmental impacts from urban growth.  
Urban runoff creates water quality risks, including beach closures in urban areas.  
Increases in the size of a metropolitan area can be associated with changes in commuting 
patterns that in turn lead to increased vehicle emissions.  Urban growth can lead to 
development pressure in sensitive habitats, leading to loss of wetlands, forest, and open 
space.  The relationship between global warming and greenhouse gas emissions leads to 
questions both about the energy efficiency of low density urban development and also 
about possible loss of forest canopy to urban growth.  Heat island effects associated with 
the urban development, while a nuisance at times, could create energy needs and, during 
heat waves, health risks in a period of global warming.   
 
All of these impacts require careful science, and the purpose of this paper is not to assess 
the environmental case for growth management.  Instead, we examine a related question.  
If governments wanted to alter the spatial pattern of urban growth, could they?  There is 
little recent empirical evidence on this question, and the evidence that does exist is 
mixed.  This paper innovates by using a regional adjustment model to specify testable 
hypotheses about whether the growth management program in Florida altered Florida’s 
development pattern.  As such, this research is as much about how to study land use 
regulations as it is about Florida. 
 
I.  Background:  Growth Control, Growth Management, and Previous Research 
 
State growth management programs date to the 1970s.  Before that time, with the 
exception of Hawaii, municipal governments had largely unfettered authority to regulate 
land use.  The early state attempts at growth managements were at times focused 
specifically on environmental impacts, although in many states the framework broadened 
to other development questions (Bollens, 1992 and 1993).   
 
At approximately the same time as state growth management programs were developing, 
local growth control became a recognizable phenomenon.  Glickfeld and Levine (1992) 
document several techniques used by California municipalities to restrict growth – often 
population growth – in their communities.  As these two trends – growth management 
and growth control – evolved, the two became rather different.  Growth controls were 
often a reaction to population growth (including growth in the metropolitan area 
surrounding the municipality) and constrained local ability to finance infrastructure 
associated with growth (Glickfeld and Levine, 1992).  Growth management evolved to 
focus more on careful planning that on restricting growth (Bollens, 1992).  While the two 
are not the same (e.g. Landis, 1992), both growth control and growth management touch 
on the general question of whether regulation can influence development patterns. 
 
An earlier literature examined the effects of growth control.  Landis (1992), in a 
comparison of seven paired growth-control and “pro-growth” cities in California using 
data from the 1980s, found little support for the idea that growth controls had an effect.  
1   Landis (1992) reported that there was not consistent evidence for the propositions that 
growth control cities had slower population growth, added new housing at slower rates, 
or had faster increases in house prices, compared to both the “pro-growth” cities and, for 
housing starts, the expected share of county housing starts based on pre-growth control 
levels.  Landis (1992) concludes that the growth control regulations in the seven study 
cities were “… largely irrelevant to the management of urban growth.” 
 
Glickfeld and Levine (1992) similarly found little evidence that local growth controls in 
California reduced residential or non-residential construction.  Fischel (1991), on the 
other hand, cites considerable evidence that growth controls increase housing prices.  
While economic theory suggests that increased prices are a sign of reduced supply, the 
evidence on housing prices typically does not bring associated evidence on urban growth 
patterns or land consumption, leaving the question of the impact of local growth controls 
on land use patterns unsettled. 
 
The local growth control programs, though, might not have been the best place to look 
for a regulatory effect.  Some local programs were designed with loopholes (Landis, 
1992), in part reflecting a mixed political consensus but in part reflecting the inherent 
difficulty of managing the problem of metropolitan growth on a municipal scale.  Also, 
the details of the local programs varied from place to place and time to time (Glickfeld 
and Levine, 1992), and the state programs, some now two decades old, likely provide a 
more long-lived, stable framework to test regulatory impacts, while also providing larger 
sample sizes if, as we do here, one uses sub-areas (such as counties) of a state as the unit 
of analysis. 
 
This paper evaluates growth management in Florida by examining its relationship to 
spatial patterns of economic development in the Atlantic Southeast region between 1982 
and 1997.  The analysis uses a regional adjustment model—a dynamic, two-equation 
structural model that accounts for interaction between population and employment in the 
growth process—to determine regional characteristics that are associated with 
equilibrium densities of people and jobs county-by-county in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee in 1987, 1992, and 1997.  
Dummy variables (defined later in this paper) are used to test whether the adjustment 
process in Florida is significantly different from the other six states in the Atlantic 
Southeast.  The study period covers three critical stages in the evolution of Florida’s 
growth management program: The trailing years of the original (1975) Local 
Government Comprehensive Planning Act; the (1985) adoption of the Florida State 
Comprehensive Plan and Growth Management Act; and an ensuing 12 years of 
implementation and revision of that legislation.  The regional adjustment model allows us 
to examine whether the adjustment process worked differently in Florida during these 
three stages of statewide planning, and whether there is there evidence of incremental 
change over the three five-year time periods that can be attributed to policy differences 
related to Florida’s growth management program.   
 
2   II.  Florida’s Growth Management Program 
 
The timeframe of the research presented in this paper, 1982 – 1997, covers the final years 
of the 1975 Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act, the 1985 adoption of the 
Florida State Comprehensive Plan and Growth Management Act, and an additional 12 
years after the more rigorous revised program was put into effect. Table 1 outlines this 
sequence of events, along with additional steps prior to, during, and just after the 15-year 
window of the study period.   
 
As in other first wave growth management states, Florida’s involvement in land use 
planning grew out of the environmental movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 
1972, an increased consciousness of land use issues led to the formation of the original 
Environmental Land Management Study Committee (ELMS I) and then to the adoption 
of the Environmental Land and Water Management Act, which protected state-designated 
critical areas and regulated developments of greater-than-local limpact.  Next, in 1975, 
the second ELMS committee was formed and the Local Government Comprehensive 
Planning Act, which required local governments to develop land use plans, was adopted.  
This law was oriented toward process, not substance, however, so while plans were in 
place statewide by the end of the decade (DeGrove 1992) it was largely an inchoate 
response to rapid growth and extensive land consumption. Nearly 10 years later, in 1984, 
on the recommendation of ELMS II, the State and Regional Planning Act was adopted, 
creating an integrated framework for state, regional, and local planning. As an outgrowth 
of this step, in 1985, the State Comprehensive Plan was adopted along with the Growth 
Management Act, which established a formal requirement that local plans be in step with 
regional plans and, in turn, with the state plan. This tightly integrated framework, which 
requires horizontal, internal, and vertical consistency and mandates concurrency between 
infrastructure and land development led one pair of researchers to the conclusion that 
“Florida has literally put it all together” (Burby and May 1997). 
 
The time periods analyzed in this study also coincide well with the important “carrot” and 
“stick” offerings to local governments mandated by the Growth Management Act of 
1985.  The carrot, which primarily consisted of both financial and technical support, 
included over $36 million in planning-specific funding for local governments between 
1985 and 1993 (Burby and May 1997).  The “stick” used by the State of Florida to 
persuade local governments to comply with statewide planning goals consists of 
withholding other sources of funding, such as shared-tax revenues provided by the state 
legislature.  This sanction was implemented in 1989 and continues to be an essential 
bartering tool for the state (Burby and May 1997).  Before those innovations, the previous 
growth policy, enacted in 1975, placed little emphasis on substance (DeGrove 1992), so it 
is possible that there were no spatial effects during the 1982-1987 time period.  If the 
enhanced funding, technical support, and enforcement had an early effect, one might 
expect an impact on Florida growth patterns during the 1987-1992 time period.  If, on the 
other hand, the enhanced funding, support, and enforcement had an effect that was 
realized with a lag, the growth pattern in Florida would most noticeably differ from the 
Atlantic Southeast in the last time period in our study, 1992-1997.  Overall, we expect 
that any “Florida effect” in growth patterns would be more evident in later time periods 
3   in our data.  The time pattern of changes in Florida’s growth management regime provide 
an ability for both cross-sectional tests (Florida compared to the rest of the Atlantic 
Southeast) and time series comparisons of the adjustment model over the three five-year 
periods. 
 
Finally, the 1990s witnessed the formation of ELMS III and several reevaluations of and 
minor adjustments to the state’s growth management program, but no changes that have 
significantly altered the overall approach. Detailed expositions of the history summarized 
here are contained in DeGrove (1992), Bollens (1992, 1993), Gale (1992), and Burby and 
May (1997).   
 
Despite the extensive effort put toward growth management in Florida, previous 
evaluations have revealed mixed results at best. For example, in a comparative analysis 
involving 14 states nationally, including five with state-based land use policy 
frameworks, Carruthers (2002) finds that that state’s planning mandate may actually 
contribute to increased land consumption. This result is consistent with earlier research 
pointing to Florida’s concurrency requirements, combined with a failure to increase road 
capacity that works as a cause of leapfrog development and urban sprawl (Porter 1997; 
Blanco 1998; Nichols and Steiner 2000). It may also be a consequence of the widespread 
variation in the degree to which local governments follow state mandated guidelines—
and, ultimately, selective use of appropriate coercive mechanisms (Deyle and Smith 
1998).  Other studies, such as those by Nelson (1999) and Kline (2000), find that Florida 
has limited sprawl when compared to other non-growth management states, such as 
neighboring Georgia. For these reasons, the questions motivating the present analysis 
remain wide open. 
 
III.  Research Approach and Model 
 
We use a lagged adjustment model of regional growth, fit on county data, to test the 
hypothesis that the Florida growth management plan changed the pattern of adjustment to 
equilibrium.  The dependent variables are population density (persons per acre) and 
employment density (jobs per acre), where both density variables are defined based on 
developed land, using data on developed land from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
National Resources Inventory, which tracks developed land at five year intervals.  The 
empirical model examines density changes across the five-year intervals, from 1982-
1987, 1987-1992, and 1992-1997.  Because the dependent variables are persons or jobs 
per acre of developed land, the empirical model examines the spatial pattern of 
development.  In particular, we can test hypotheses about whether Florida’s growth 
management program is associated with changes to higher or lower densities, the speed 
of such changes, and thus the association between the growth management program and 
the transition of undeveloped or agricultural land into urban uses controlling for 
population and employment growth. 
 
Before proceeding to the full model, some discussion of urban growth theory is 
important.  Broadly speaking, there are two perspectives on urban growth – a 
disequilibrium and an equilibrium perspective.  Both perspectives can be based on 
4   models of individual actors, in this case residents and firms, maximizing (respectively) 
utility and profit in part by choosing their location in an urban area.  In equilibrium, 
residents have equal utility at all locations and firms earn the same profit at all locations; 
the possibility of utility or profit increasing moves is not present in the long-run 
equilibrium, as all utility-increasing (for residents) or profit-increasing (for firms) moves 
have been made.  If the metropolitan space-economy is in long-run equilibrium, a 
regression of, for example, population levels and employment levels on location-specific 
characteristics would be a common empirical framework.  First differencing such a 
specification would lead to a model that regresses changes in the dependent variable on 
changes in the independent variables.  If, on the other hand, the economy is in 
disequilibrium, and so counties adjust to (for example) population and employment 
densities slowly over time, regressing changes in the dependent variables on lagged 
levels of the independent variables is common.  Both of these two types of specifications 
are grounded in theory, and for examples of the theory that underlies the equilibrium 
viewpoint, see e.g. Roback (1982), while for an example of the theoretical underpinnings 
of the disequilibrium model see, e.g., Carlino and Mills (1987) or Boarnet (1994a and 
1994b).  For a recent discussion of the two approaches, see, e.g., Henderson (2006). 
 
We use a disequilibrium model of urban growth in this research, for two reasons.  First, 
past research has found evidence that metropolitan population and employment patterns 
adjust to long-run equilibrium with a lag that, given available measures of adjustment 
speed, appears to be on the order of one to three decades.  (For a summary of estimates of 
adjustment speed in regional adjustment models, see Boarnet, Chalermpong, and Geho, 
2005, Table 1.)  Second, the Florida growth management program, if it influenced growth 
patterns, would change either the equilibrium or the speed of adjustment to a pre-existing 
equilibrium, and so would be a disequilibrium phenomenon. 
 
We also note that regional adjustment models incorporate elements of the equilibrium 
approach, since regional adjustment models can be specified to have both lagged levels 
and changes of some variables on the right-hand side.  The change variables appear when 
the initial theoretical model posits interaction between units of geography.  The 
interaction could be complementarities between county economies created through, for 
example, commuting patterns (see, e.g., Boarnet 1994a and 1994b) or more general 
patterns of complementarities or substitution through, for example, the geographic 
concepts of development spread or backwash (see, e.g., Henry, Barkley, and Bao, 1997).  
Such adaptations require a spatial econometric approach, and while we do not present 
results of spatial econometric regressions here, such extensions are possible and common 
with the regional adjustment framework. 
 
Regional adjustment models were first developed by Steinnes and Fisher (1974), and 
popularized by Carlino and Mills (1987), with spatial econometric extensions developed 
by Boarnet (1994a and 1994b).  Different versions of this modeling framework have been 
used for analyses of growth at the metropolitan (Steinnes and Fisher 1974; Mills and 
Price 1984; Boarnet 1994a, 1994b; Bollinger and Ihlanfeldt 1997; Boarnet et al. 2005), 
sub-national (Steinnes 1977; Duffy-Deno 1998; Vias 1999; Vias and Mulligan 1999; 
Henry et al. 1997, 1999, 2001; Carruthers and Vias 2003), and national (Carlino and 
5   Mills 1987; Mills and Lubuele 1995; Clark and Murphy 1996; Deller et al. 2001; Glavac 
et al. 1999; Mulligan et al. 1999; Liechenko 2001; Carruthers and Mulligan 2004, 2005) 
scales.  Regional adjustment models have been used for policy analysis on questions that 
include the impact of rail transit on employment growth (Bollinger and Ihlanfeldt, 1997), 
modeling sprawl in the Rocky Mountain region (Carruthers and Vias, 2005), the effect of 
military base closure on local economies (Poppert and Herzog, 2003), and the link 
between large plant location and employment growth (Edmiston, 2004). 
 
Following Carlino and Mills (1987) and Boarnet (1994a and 1994b), population and 




* = f(ICPi,t-1, Edi,t
*)   (1a) 
 
 Edi,t
* = g(ICEi,t-1, Pdi,t
*)    (1b) 
 
Where Pd = population density 
  Ed = employment density 
  ICP = initial conditions that influence county population density 
  ICE = initial conditions that influence county employment density 
  
Note that the IC vector will vary across the population and employment density 
relationships, as reflected in the development of the model below. 
 
  * denotes equilibrium values, “i” indexes counties, “t” indexes time periods 
 
Densities are assumed to adjust to their equilibrium levels with a lag, following the 
process shown below. 
 
∆Pd  = Pd i  - Pd i  = λ  (Pd* i  - Pd i )     (2a)  i,t ,t ,t−1 p ,t ,t−1
∆Ed i  = Ed i  - Ed i  = λ  (Ed* i  - Ed i )     (2b)  ,t ,t ,t−1 e ,t ,t−1
where, 
Pd i  = actual population in county i at time t;  ,t
Pd i  = actual population density in county i at time t-1;  ,t−1
Pd* i  = equilibrium population density in county i at time t-1;  ,t
 
employment densities are defined in a similar fashion, and λ  and λ  represent the 
adjustment parameters with λ  and λ  ∈ [0, 1].   Substituting linear versions of (1a) and 
p e
p e
6   (1b) into (2a) and (2b), and expanding the representation of initial conditions into 
different vectors of variables, yields
1
 
  ∆Pd  = Pd i  - Pd i  = γ + X i,t ,t ,t−1 0 tγ1 + Ytγ2 + γ3Ed* t - λ Pd p t−1 + u    (3a) 
  ∆Ed i  = Ed i  - Ed i  = δ + X ,t ,t ,t−1 0 tδ1 + Zδ2 + δ3Pd* t - λ Ed e t−1 + v     (3b) 
The vectors are defined as follows: 
X = a vector of characteristics that affect the equilibrium population      
and employment densities in Atlantic Southeast counties; 
 
Y = a vector of characteristics that affect only population density in Atlantic 
Southeast counties; 
  
Z = a vector of characteristics that affect only the equilibrium employment density 
in Atlantic Southeast counies;  
 
  u and v are error terms. 
 
In the equations (3a) and (3b), population and employment equilibriums are not 
observable characteristics.  Using algebraic manipulations of equations (2a) and (2b), 
however, it is possible to substitute these equilibriums with observable densities.  
Rearranging equations (2a) and (2b) yields: 
   Pd* i  = Pd i  +  ,t ,t−1
1
λp
( Pd i  - Pd i ),   (4a)  ,t ,t−1
   Ed* i  = Ed i  +  ,t ,t−1
1
λe
( Ed i  - Ed i ),   (4b)  ,t ,t−1
Substitution of (4a) and (4b) into (3a) and (3b) yields the specification: 
∆Pd  = Pd i  - Pd i  = γ + X i,t ,t ,t−1 0 tγ1 + Yγ2 + γ3 Ed i  +  ,t−1
e λ
γ 3
( Ed i  - Ed i )    
 –    λ pPd
,t ,t−1
t−1  +   u           ( 5 a )  
                                                 
1   For a more complete discussion of this model, see Boarnet (1994a and 1994b) or Boarnet, Chalermpong, 
and Geho (2005). 
7   ∆Ed i  = Ed i  - Ed i  = δ + X ,t ,t ,t−1 0 tδ1 + Zδ2 + δ3 Pd i  +  ,t−1
p λ
δ 3
( Pd i  - Pd i )  
  -   λ Ed
,t ,t−1
e t−1  +   v         ( 5 b )  
Following the methodology of Carlino and Mills (1987) and Boarnet (1994), the final 
step is to lag all of the initial conditions and exogenous variables to the base year to assist 
with identifying the system, which gives the complete specification of: 
∆Pd  = γ + X i,t 0 t−1γ1 + Y t−1γ2 + γ3 Ed i  +  ,t−1
e λ
γ 3
(Ed i  - Ed i )  ,t ,t−1
   - λ Pd p t−1 + u                      (6a)    
 
 
∆Ed i  = δ + X ,t 0 t−1δ1 + Z t−1δ2 + δ3 Pd i  +  ,t−1
p λ
δ 3
(Pd i  - Pd i )  ,t ,t−1
   -  λ eEd t−1 + v.                       (6b) 
 
The variables λp and λ  are the fraction of the gap between equilibrium and actual levels 
that are closed in a time period, or a speed of adjustment.
e
2  (Give the availability of the 
NRI data, each time period is five-years in the empirical model.)  Our hypothesis is that 
the Florida growth management regime changed the speed of adjustment, which we test 
by interacting dummy variables for Florida counties with the adjustment parameters, λp 
and λ e.  A test of the significance of that interaction term tests the hypothesis that the 
adjustment process in Florida differs from the rest of the Atlantic Southeast.  We then 
expand the definition of the dummy variables to represent only Florida counties that were 
early and aggressive compliers with the growth management regime, to test the 
hypothesis that those counties’ adjustment process differed from the Atlantic Southeast 
region. 
 
IV.  Data 
 
The variables used to implement the model in equations (6a) and (6b) are listed in Table 
2, with descriptive statistics.  The dependent variables are population and employment 
density changes during the three time periods, 1982-1987, 1987-1992, and 1992-1997.  
The density variables are constructed from population and employment data, by county, 
available from the U.S. City and County Data Book and the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Activity (BEA) County Business Patterns, and from measures of developed land area in 
the county from the National Resources Inventory (NRI). 
 
                                                 
2   Note that we do not enforce the full parameter restrictions implied by the regression model, and instead 
only estimate the adjustment parameter from the coefficient on the lagged values of population and 
employment density.  For a discussion of this issue, see Boarnet, Chalermpong, and Geho (2005). 
8   The NRI data are based on a national survey of over 800,000 land use sample points, 
conducted in five year intervals in 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997.  For each sample point, 
land use characteristics were inferred from remote sensing data, aerial photographs, or 
site visits.  The result yields information on developed land in each county, which is the 
denominator in the density variable.  For more information on the NRI, see Nusser and 
Goebel (1997) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (2000). 
 
Planning data for the State of Florida used in this paper was acquired from Mr. Ray 
Eubanks, the Plan Review Administrator for the Division of Community Planning of the 
Department of Community Affairs.  The data set contains detailed information on the 
first round plan review outcomes, which includes dates of first submission and approval 
status, and the inclusion of optional plan elements for all cities and counties in the State 
of Florida. 
 
Other data used in the analysis was acquired from publicly released data sets.  County 
government fiscal variables can be obtained from the bi-decadal U.S. Census of 
Governments (COG) data sets, for the years 1982, 1987, and 1992.  Criminal activity data 
can be acquired from the U.S. FBI yearly report on crime via the U.S. City and County 
Data Book.  Employment data categorized by one-digit SIC codes are from County 
Business Patterns.  The urban, suburban, exurban codes were constructed from U.S. 
Census Beale codes.  The amenity score is from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and 
is constructed by combining six measures of climate, typography, and water area that 
measure warm winter, winter sun, temperate summer, low summer humidity, topographic 
variation, and water area.  See http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/NaturalAmenities/.  
 
V.   Results  
 
The key explanatory variables are the adjustment parameters, which, in the population 
density change regression, are the coefficients on lagged (or base year) population 
density and the coefficients on the interaction terms between base year population density 
and the Florida dummy variable, dummy variables for compliance status and status of the 
optional education element in the county, and a modified compliance variable.  These 
variables are shown below: 
 
Population Density Change Regression: 
 
Popdenp (base year population density): negative of the coefficient on this 
variable is the adjustment parameter, λp
  
  Florida:  dummy variable, = 1 if county is in Florida, 0 otherwise 
 
  Florida*Popdenp:  coefficient on this variable plus coefficient on Popdenp is 
adjustment parameter for Florida counties 
 
9     Compliance1:  dummy variable, = 1 if county was in compliance with state 
growth management requirements (including growth management plan approved) 
by 1994 
 
Florida*Popdenp*Compliance1:  coefficient on this variable plus coefficients on 
Popdenp and Florida*Popdenp is adjustment parameter for complying counties in 
Florida 
 
Education:  dummy variable, = 1 if county was in compliance and filed an 
optional education element, as a proxy for planning that went beyond minimum 
state requirements 
 
Florida*Popdenp*Education:  coefficient on this variable plus coefficients on 
Popdenp and Florida*Popdenp is adjustment parameter for counties that filed 
optional educational element in Florida 
 
Compliance2:  the percentage of county population living in jurisdictions that 
complied (including approved growth management plan) by 1994 
 
Compliance2 is an alternate measure of compliance, and is interacted in the same 
fashion as Compliance1 
 
Note that the structure of the model in equations (6a) and (6b) implies that the negative of 
the coefficients on base year population (employment) density, plus the negative of the 
coefficients on the interaction terms, is the adjustment parameter.  We did not mention 
this sign change in each step of the variable definitions above, but it is implied 
throughout.  When examining the coefficients, a negative coefficient implies a positive 
adjustment parameter and vice versa.  Negative adjustment parameters (i.e. positive 
coefficients on the lag parameter) are not consistent with a model that is dynamically 
stable, and so raise specification issues discussed in Boarnet, Chalermpong, and Geho 
(2005).
3  For those reasons, we will focus our attention on models that yield positive 
adjustment parameters. 
 
These variables allow step-wise tests, first of the hypothesis that the adjustment process 
in Florida differs from the adjustment process in the Atlantic Southeast (a test of the 
significance of the coefficient on Florida*Popdenp) and then tests of the hypothesis that 
any Florida difference is due to counties that complied with the growth management plan, 
where compliance is measured by Compliance1, Compliance2, and Education.  For 
examples of how these key variables are added sequentially to the model, see the 
regression results in Tables 3 – 8. 
                                                 
3   Technically, having at least one positive adjustment parameter in the two equation system is a necessary 
condition for dynamic stability.  A formal test for dynamic stability requires solving for the roots of the 
characteristic equation resulting from reduced form regressions, see, e.g. Boarnet, Chalermpong, and Geho 
(2005) or Carlino and Mills (1987).  To allow easier interpretation, common practice in this literature has 
been to focus on the necessary condition that at least one adjustment parameter should be positive, and to 
more generally focus on sign of all adjustment parameters. 
10    
A similar set of interaction variables is used for the employment density change equation, 
in that case interacting the variables with base year employment density.  The 
Compliance1, Compliance2, and Education variables are from the Florida Department of 
Community Affairs, as described in Section IV. 
 
Before going further, some discussion of the Compliance1 and Compliance2 variables is 
necessary.  Compliance1 indicates whether the county government growth management 
plan was approved, but municipalities within a complying county may or may not have 
approved growth management plans.  Compliance2 addresses that by taking a population 
weighted average of the compliance status of all jurisdictions in the county.  We believe 
it is unclear which variable should be preferred.  The key issue is compliance for 
jurisdictions that control developable or soon-to-be developed land.  In some cases, that 
might be primarily the county government (if growth is mostly occurring in 
unincorporated areas), and in those cases Compliance1 would better measure the growth 
management program as it applies to new development.  If, on the other hand, most new 
development is under municipal rather than county control, Compliance2 would be 
preferred.  Because further analysis would be required to assess where developable land 
is in relation to jurisdictions, here we report tests with both variables.  The Education 
variable only applies to the county. 
 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Table 2.  Regression results are shown 
in Tables 3-8, with summary results for the key adjustment parameters in Tables 9-13.  
Tables 9-13, which summarize the key variables of interest from the regressions shown in 
Tables 3-8, are our primary focus. 
 
From looking at Tables 9-13, first note that that the adjustment process for the 
employment density equation gives ambiguous results  – the adjustment parameters for 
employment are all statistically insignificant, and the interaction terms in the employment 
equation are also all statistically insignificant.
4  One possible conclusion is that the 
employment density adjustment process is not fully specified by the current regression 
model, and another conclusion is that no inference can be made about the equilibrium 
adjustment of employment densities.
5  In short, we cannot conclude that the growth 
management program changed employment density patterns.  On the other hand, there is 
a clear pattern for population density.  For that reason, we focus attention on population 
density.  We note that a reasonable expectation is that growth management more likely 
affected population densities than employment densities; most growth management 
programs have their origins in concerns about population growth, not employment 
growth.  Thus a focus only on population density can give insights into Florida’s 
program. 
                                                 
4   The employment regression results reported in Tables 4, 6, and 8 use the number of multi-family 
building permits as an instrument for population change.  Out of concern that the number of multi-family 
building permits in the base year is potentially endogenous, we also ran regressions without that variable as 
an instrument.  The results, in terms of sign and significance, were unchanged. 
5   See Boarnet, Chalermpong, and Geho (2005) for evidence that adding independent variables can yield 
measurements of adjustment parameters that imply dynamic stability, while sparse models with fewer 
independent variables can suggest a dynamically instable adjustment process. 
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Looking at the summary tables, Tables 9-13, some patterns emerge.  The adjustment 
parameter for the Atlantic Southeast (the coefficient on base year population density, 
labeled λ in Tables 9-13), is approximately 0.2.  Approximately twenty percent of the gap 
between equilibrium and actual population densities is closed in each five-year period, 
implying a process that takes about 25 years to converge to equilibrium.  This is 
consistent with past research, which has found convergence speeds of 10 to 30 years 
(Boarnet, Chalermpong, and Geho, 2005).   
 
The Florida interaction variable is always significantly positive, in all time periods, 
implying that the adjustment process in Florida is slower than the Atlantic Southeast.  
There is a clear “Florida effect”, but is that due to the growth management program or to 
other (unmeasured) factors?  To address this question, we look at the models with 
interaction variables for Compliance1, Education, and Compliance2. 
 
In the 1982-1987 time period, the interaction variables for Compliance1, Education, and 
Compliance2 are all insignificant, suggesting that whatever is causing Florida’s 
population density adjustment process to differ from the Atlantic Southeast, it is not 
related to our measures of state growth management compliance.  Note that we do not 
expect significant Compliance1, Education, and Compliance2 variables in the 1982-1987 
time period, since those variables show compliance status as of the early 1990’s.  
Including the variables in the 1982-1987 time period is a robustness test, to confirm that 
the variables do not proxy for time-invariant, unmeasured characteristics of the counties, 
but instead are associated with the planning process, and the insignificant results for those 
variables in 1982-1987 provide some assurance along those lines. 
 
Looking at the last time period, 1992-1997, the Compliance1 interaction variable is 
significantly positive, but when the Education interaction variable is added the 
Compliance1 variables becomes insignificant while Education is significant.  This 
suggests that independent of the “Florida effect”, counties that complied with the state 
growth management plan had slower adjustment toward equilibrium, and the effect is 
driven by the counties that filed the optional education planning element.  The 
Compliance2 variable is not significant. 
 
Both compliance variables are insignificant in the 1987-1992 time period, but Education 
remains significant.  If the significance of the Education variables in the 1987-1992 time 
period is meaningful, that would imply that the optional education element was indicative 
of a careful planning process, and that the counties that filed the optional education 
element were “early compliers” with the spirit of the enhanced growth management 
requirements of the 1984 ELMS II law and the 1985 State Comprehensive Planning Act.  
While this is possible, we note that the evidence on this question, based on the existing 
regression analysis reported in this paper, is indirect and not conclusive. 
 
The Education variable becomes insignificant in the 1987-1992 time period when the 
number of multi-family building permits in 1987 is added to the population density 
model.  We do not report those regression results, out of concern that with foresight on 
12   the part of local planners, multi-family building permits in the base year could be 
endogenous to later growth.  Yet we note that the number of 1987 multi-family building 
permits is correlated with adopting the optional education element in the early 1990s (r = 
0.83), a result that is not surprising.  Places that have rapid population growth and strong 
planning appeared to both permit multi-family dwellings in the late 1980s and be early 
filers of the optional education element, which focuses on planning for school and school 
construction.  While not unexpected, this does hint at some specification questions that 
we discuss more fully later. 
 
The results are in some ways driven by counties that filed optional education elements.  
Only four counties filed those elements, suggesting that the evidence on the effect of the 
growth management plan is in part driven by outliers.  Yet an examination of those 
outliers gives an intriguing result.  The four counties that filed education elements are 
listed in Table 14. 
 
Table 14 
Counties in Okeechobee Basin, sorted by 
1997 population 
County pop97  Education  Element
DADE 2,158,352 yes 
BROWARD 1,522,179 yes 
PALM BEACH  1,069,718 yes 
ORANGE 829,072 yes 
POLK 463,519 no 
LEE 410,841 no 
COLLIER 220,923 no 
ST. LUCIE  184,633 no 
OSCEOLA 153,082 no 
CHARLOTTE 134,959 no 
MARTIN 120,279 no 
HIGHLANDS 84,334 no 
MONROE 80,925 no 
OKEECHOBEE 34,030 no 
HENDRY 33,962 no 
GLADES 9,789 no 
 
The four counties that filed the education element – Dade (or Miami/Dade), Broward, 
Palm Beach, and Orange, are the four largest counties in the environmentally sensitive 
Okeechobee Basin.  The Okeechobee Basin is shown in Figure 1, below. 
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Figure 1:  Counties in Okeechobee Basin 
 
 
Source:  South Florida Water Management District, 
http://www.sfwmd.gov/site/index.php?id=777. 
 
One interpretation is that the four counties that drive the growth management portion of 
the “Florida effect” are the counties that were large, urbanized, growing, and in key 
environmentally sensitive areas that would have, in part, inspired the Florida growth 
management program.  There is some evidence that the population density adjustment 
process slowed in Broward, Dade, Orange, and Palm Beach Counties.  Whether that 
slowing is due to the growth management regime or other factors is still unclear.  Our 
interpretation is that currently the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
growth management regime had an impact, but there are currently too many unresolved 
specification issues to draw a firm conclusion. 
 
Lastly, we note that in the 1992-1997 time period, 78 percent of Florida’s population 
lived in counties that were adjusting to a lower population density equilibrium.
6  Thus a 
slower adjustment process is a slower change to lower densities.  If the evidence suggests 
                                                 
6   The gap between equilibrium and observed population density is derived by calculating the equilibrium 
population density for each county using equation 4a, and subtracting the observed population density in 
1992.  Note that, given that λp is positive, the sign of the gap between equilibrium and actual population 
density is the same as the sign of the gap between 1997 (observed) and 1992 (observed) population density. 
14   that Florida’s growth management program influenced population densities, that 
influence was to slow what was, for 78 percent of persons living in Florida in 1992-1997, 
a trend toward population deconcentration.  The evidence does not suggest that absolute 
population densities increased in Florida, but instead that the move toward lower 
densities slowed in ways that might be associated with the growth management program. 
 
 
VI.  Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
 
The evidence suggests a clear “Florida effect”.  Population deconcentration (measured by 
changes in densities) was slower in Florida than the rest of the Atlantic Southeast.  Was 
that due to the growth management legislation?  Here the evidence is suggestive but not 
conclusive.  Complying counties showed an even slower adjustment speed than other 
Florida counties (for population density), but questions about measurement and 
specification require additional research. 
 
Below we list key areas for future research. 
 
•  Measuring growth management compliance:  Complying with both the letter and 
the spirit of the state’s growth management legislation is a key concept.  We have 
suggested variables that can measure compliance, but further research is needed to 
understand how well those variables correspond to local planning activity.  
Another measurement issue, also vital, is to better assess planning activity that 
applies to developable and re-developable land, as that is the planning that is most 
relevant for changes in density. 
 
•  Quality of the instruments:  A fundamental issue for regional adjustment models 
is the validity of the instruments for the endogenous variables, in this case 
population and employment density.  All variables other than population and 
employment density were lagged to the base year of each time period, but 
questions of foresight, and hence instrument validity, remain.  Past research has 
used overidentification tests of instrument validity (e.g. Boarnet, Chalermpong, 
and Geho, 2005 and Boarnet, 1994a and 1994b), and we suggest using similar 
tests here. 
 
•  Measuring land supply:  Land supply would, presumably, be a constraining factor 
related to density change, and one might imagine that counties with little available 
land could also be counties with careful planning.  We included the number of 
acres in agriculture in each county as a control variable in early research, but that 
variable was always insignificant and did not change other results, so those 
specifications are not report here.  Future research should include better measures 
of the supply of developable land. 
 
•  Better tests of whether growth management protected environmentally sensitive 
lands:  The dependent variables in this study were population and employment 
densities, which can address the broad question of whether growth patterns 
15   changed.  Yet future research should examine more directly whether 
environmentally sensitive lands were protected.  In concept, lower density growth 
could be consistent with protection of environmentally sensitive land.  Stated 
differently, not all land is the same when the goal is environmental protection.  
Future research should examine methods for classifying land based on 
environmental impacts from development, and then examine how growth 
management influences development on environmentally sensitive land. 
 
Overall, there is a need for much additional research on this topic.  Planners’ tools have 
long been suggested as methods for environmental protection, and many land use 
controls have their roots in concepts of environmental regulation.  Yet we still know little 
about the effectiveness of land use regulation in changing growth patterns and protecting 
environmentally sensitive land from development.  A key difficulty is determining the 
counter-factual – what would have happened absent land use regulation?  This paper 
argues that one method for determining that counter-factual, and hence for researching 
land use controls, is to adapt regional adjustment models as has been done here.  
Certainly that is not the only possible empirical approach, but the results suggest that 
adjustment models can play a role in studying the impacts of land use regulation. 
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20   Table 1:  Timeline of State Growth Management in Florida 
 
1972  ELMS I – adoption of the Environmental Land and Water Management Act 
1975  ELMS II – adoption of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act 
1984  Adoption of the State and Regional Planning Act 
1985  Adoption of the Florida State Comprehensive Plan and Growth Management Act 
1991  ELMS III – Growth Management added to the Florida State Comprehensive Plan 
1994  Evaluation of the Florida State Comprehensive Plan 
1998  Re-evaluation of the Florida State Comprehensive Plan 
 
Source:  Growth Management Study Commission, http://www.floridagrowth.org. 




Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
          
PopDenChange (persons/developed acres)  616 -0.19 0.38 -3.79 0.89
EmpDenChange (employees/developed acres) 616 0.00 0.17 -1.16 0.76
EmpDen T-1  616 0.93 0.70 0.10 10.39
PopDen T-1  616 2.26 1.15 0.41 12.06
Amenity 616 0.46 1.42 -2.93 6.05
Urban 616 0.29 0.46 0 1
Suburban 616 0.29 0.45 0 1
Exurban 616 0.30 0.46 0 1
Expenditure/Pupil ($1,000) 615 2.10 0.84 0.24 15.17
GenRevenue/Person (dollars) 616 818.44 264.88 65.00 4323.00
DirectExpen/Person (dollars)  616 797.96 0.09 55.00 4957.00
TotTax/Person ($1,000)  616 0.20 0.09 0.02 0.73
PropertyTax/Person ($1,000)  616 0.15 0.08 0.01 0.67
ViolentCrm/Person (incidents/Persons) 590 2.81E-03 2.70E-03 0 0.02
PropertyCrm/Person (incidents/persons)  590 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.09
Income/Person (dollars)  616 8022.18 1551.10 4851.00 15440.00
Percent Black  616 0.25 0.19 0.00 0.84
Percent White  616 0.75 0.19 0.15 1.00
Percent Manufacturing  581 0.43 0.18 0.02 0.88
Percent FIRE  524 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.28
Percent Retail  603 0.20 0.07 0.01 0.56




Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
          
PopDenChange (persons/developed acres)  616 -0.16 0.30 -4.41 0.92
EmpDenChange (employees/developed acres) 616 -0.05 0.26 -5.81 0.48
EmpDen T-1  616 0.93 0.72 0.10 10.83
PopDen T-1  616 2.07 0.99 0.33 9.09
Amenity 616 0.46 1.42 -2.93 6.05
Urban 616 0.29 0.46 0 1
Suburban 616 0.29 0.45 0 1
Exurban 616 0.30 0.46 0 1
Expenditure/Pupil ($1,000) 616 3.08 0.92 0.62 10.61
GenRevenue/Person (dollars) 616 1175.42 423.16 130.00 5639.00
DirectExpen/Person (dollars)  616 1125.98 446.68 119.00 6736.00
TotTax/Person ($1,000)  616 0.30 0.14 0.04 1.31
PropertyTax/Person ($1,000)  616 0.22 0.12 0.01 1.12
ViolentCrm/Person (incidents/Persons) 586 3.20E-03 3.05E-03 0 0.02
22   23   
PropertyCrm/Person (incidents/persons)  586 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.11
Income/Person (dollars)  616 11222.05 2343.35 6504.00 23111.00
Percent Black  616 0.24 0.19 0.00 0.85
Percent White  616 0.75 0.19 0.14 1.00
Percent Manufacturing  581 0.39 0.17 0.02 0.91
Percent FIRE  563 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.49
Percent Retail  612 0.21 0.07 0.00 0.49





Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
          
PopDenChange (persons/developed acres)  616 -0.18 0.21 -1.53 0.54
EmpDenChange (employees/developed acres) 616 -0.04 0.15 -1.97 1.61
EmpDen T-1  616 0.88 0.58 0.08 5.02
PopDen T-1  616 1.91 0.86 0.33 7.86
Amenity 616 0.46 1.42 -2.93 6.05
Urban 616 0.29 0.46 0 1
Suburban 616 0.29 0.45 0 1
Exurban 616 0.30 0.46 0 1
Expenditure/Pupil ($1,000) 615 4.53 3.74 0.20 86.72
GenRevenue/Person (dollars) 616 1614.96 554.92 218.00 6096.00
DirectExpen/Person (dollars)  616 1574.70 558.09 221.00 5766.00
TotTax/Person ($1,000)  616 0.45 0.21 0.07 1.70
PropertyTax/Person ($1,000)  616 0.32 0.19 0.02 1.55
ViolentCrm/Person (incidents/Persons) 590 4.52E-03 3.98E-03 0 0.02
PropertyCrm/Person (incidents/persons)  590 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.11
Income/Person (dollars)  616 14824.32 2868.21 9346.00 31406.00
Percent Black  616 0.29 0.68 0.00 15.60
Percent White  616 0.91 2.18 0.01 44.22
Percent Manufacturing  581 0.37 0.17 0.02 0.89
Percent FIRE  524 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.14
Percent Retail  612 0.22 0.07 0.02 0.48
Percent Services  616 0.21 0.10 0 0.74
 Table 3:  Regression Results for County Population Density Change, 1982-1987 
Variable  FL Dummy  Fl Dummy Compliance1 
Fl  Comp1 + 
Education  FL + Compliance2 
Fl + 
Comp2+Education 
EmpDenChange*  1.182151 (6.67)  1.195034 (6.66)  1.168836 (6.85)  1.19472 (6.79)  1.182827 (7.19) 
EmpDen T-1  .0546106 (1.55)  .0528088 (1.49)  .048618 (1.35)  .054889 (1.57)  .0518664 (1.47) 
Amenity  -.0095134 (-1.22)  -.0093634 (-1.18)  -.0094406 (-1.20)  -.0097797 (-1.24) -.0095372  (-1.23) 
Urban  .0111181 (0.30)  .0095434 (0.26)  .0107244 (0.29)  .0106172 (0.29)  .0118862 (0.32) 
Suburban  -.0186212 (-0.54)  -.018496 (-0.53)  -.0196822 (-0.56)  -.0184353 (-0.53) -.0184268  (-0.53) 
Exurban  -.0147238 (-0.44)  -.0145085 (-0.44)  -.0152794 (-0.46)  -.0144051 (-0.44) -.0143499  (-0.43) 
Expenditure/Pupil -.001297  (-0.09)  -.0011931 (-0.08)  -.000713 (-0.05)  -.0009353 (-0.07)  -.0004456 (-0.03) 
GenRevenue/Person -.0000225  (-0.45)  -.0000229 (-0.45)  -.0000237 (-0.47)  -.0000239 (-0.48)  -.0000247 (-0.49) 
DirectExpen/Person  .0000232 (0.67)  .0000228 (0.66)  .000023 (0.66)  .0000236 (0.69)  .0000241 (0.70) 
TotTax/Person -.5098588  (-2.14)  -.5026785 (-2.08)  -.5114328 (-2.10)  -.5033024 (-2.11)  -.5188447 (-2.16) 
PropertyTax/Person  .4174213 (1.79)  .4083642 (1.74)        .4140014  (1.75) .4068658  (1.75) .4163575  (1.78)
ViolentCrm/Person  -3.749445 (-0.81)  -3.8654 (-0.84)  -4.2882 (-0.92)  -3.719318 (-0.81)  -4.061666 (-0.88) 
PropertyCrm/Person  .840073 (1.03)  .8255967 (1.02)        .9645368  (1.17) .8320178  (1.03) .9479272  (1.15)
Income/Person  .0000224 (2.51)  .0000225 (2.48)  .0000234 (2.58)  .0000218 (2.46)  .0000222 (2.52) 
Percent Black  .3814266 (1.16)  .3843619 (1.17)  .3820782 (1.15)  .3849268 (1.17)  .3835171 (1.16) 
Percent White  .179784 (0.55)  .1805398 (0.55)  .1791706 (0.54)  .183099 (0.56)  .1827208 (0.56) 
Pop Den T-1  -.1952269 (-10.11)  -.1931859 (-10.18)  -.1940987 (-10.27)  -.193912 (-10.11) -.1944937  (-10.27) 
FL*PopDen T-1  .0648634 (4.65)  .0667705 (4.08)  .0630727 (3.71)  .071449 (4.30)  .066724 (3.81) 
FL*PopDen T-1*Comply  -  -.0187892 (-0.46)        -.0252459  (-0.62) - -
FL*PopDen T-1*Education  -  -  .028048 (0.91)  -  .0257518 (0.84) 
FL*PopDen T-1*Comply2  -  -  -  -.0342489 (-0.95)  -.0348305 (-0.96) 
R^2 0.8347 0.8361 0.8337 0.8363 0.8354
adj R^2  0.8284 0.8295 0.8267 0.8297 0.8284
N 492 492 492 492 492
*Denotes Endogenous Variable         
Percent employment in manufacturing, FIRE, retail, and services are used as instruments.     
 
24   Table 4:  Regression Results for County Employment Density Change, 1982-1987 
Variable  FL Dummy  Fl Dummy Compliance1  Fl  Comp1 + Education  FL + Compliance2 
Fl + 
Comp2+Education 
PopDenChange* .3605493  (4.01)  .3699133 (4.07)  .3904178 (3.47)  .3594068 (3.95)  .3725658 (2.73) 
PopDen T-1  -.074683 (-0.34)  -.0231858 (-0.14)  -.1076548 (-0.57)  -.0887424 (-0.39)    -.2232645  (-0.80)
Amenity        -.0022456 (-0.24)     -.0035955 (-0.60) 7.66e-06  (0.00) -.001746 (-0.19)  .0036962 (0.36) 
Urban  .0433561 (0.47)  .0225379 (0.32)  .0584677 (0.74)  .0488765 (0.52)  .1036603 (0.90) 
Suburban  -.0226351 (-0.52)  -.0304833 (-0.97)  -.0133777 (-0.38)  -.0203521 (-0.47)  .0040334 (0.08) 
Exurban  -.0303957 (-1.19)  -.0326525 (-1.52)  -.0265243 (-1.05)  -.0297137 (-1.14)    -.0215068  (-0.63)
Expenditure/Pupil -.0114498  (-1.11)  -.0107475 (-1.12)  -.0122512 (-1.07)  -.0116469 (-1.08)  -.0128021 (-0.86) 
GenRevenue/Person .0000171  (0.33)  .0000247 (0.62)  .0000126 (0.27)  .0000151 (0.29)  -7.27e-06 (-0.11) 
DirectExpen/Person -.0000376  (-1.57)  -.0000359 (-1.75)  -.0000403 (-1.66)  -.0000382 (-1.55)  -.0000448 (-1.36) 
TotTax/Person  .0533564 (0.09)  .1907902 (0.41)  -.0454053 (-0.09)  .0148788 (0.02)    -.3527539  (-0.46)
PropertyTax/Person  -.0658489 (-0.17)  -.1527628 (-0.48)        -.0124536  (-0.03) -.0417975  (-0.10) .1771115  (0.34)
ViolentCrm/Person -7.238112  (-0.83)  -5.504542 (-0.92)  -8.413037 (-1.24)  -7.735211 (-0.87)  -12.824 (-1.19) 
PropertyCrm/Person      -.2577758  (-0.16)  .0574003  (0.05)  -.6253673 (-0.53)  -.352048 (-0.22) -1.324512  (-0.74)
Income/Person -3.28e-06  (-0.18)  5.44e-07 (0.04)  -8.11e-06 (-0.61)  -4.26e-06 (-0.24)  -.0000156 (-0.81) 
Percent Manufacturing  -.1256996 (-0.89)  -.0939108 (-0.76)        -.1492767  (-1.06) -.1340412  (-0.90) -.2103895  (-1.11)
Percent FIRE  .2353575 (0.31)  .3706864 (0.73)  .070353 (0.13)  .197487 (0.26)  -.2380146 (-0.28) 
Percent Retail  -.2250486 (-1.09)  -.2506601 (-1.83)  -.2030191 (-1.28)  -.2167319 (-1.06)    -.1158344  (-0.46)
Percent Services  -.0021433 (-0.01)  .0303582 (0.21)  -.0288761 (-0.18)  -.0110064 (-0.06)    -.0996545  (-0.43)
Emp Den T-1  .1278918 ( 0.57)  .2244222 (0.78)  .2697372 (0.94)  .1644735 (0.67)  .2137794 (0.85) 
FL*EmpDen T-1  .025622 (0.68)  .0324169 (0.78)  .0421876 (0.95)  .0269027 (0.71)  .0390204 (0.92) 
FL*EmpDen T-1*Comply  -  .0632466 (1.12)  .0609948 (1.02)  -  - 
FL*EmpDen T-1*Education -  -   '-.0256195 (-0.74)  -  -.0262254 (-0.78) 
FL*EmpDen T-1*Comply2  -  -  -  .0310303 (0.61)  .0169663 (0.28) 
R^2 0.7003 0.755 0.6493 0.6809 0.38
Adj R^2  0.6866 0.7432 0.6315 0.6654 0.3485
N 456 456 456 456 456
*Denotes Endogenous Variable         
Percent Black population, percent White population, and number of mulitfamily building permits are used as instruments. 
25   Table 5:  Regression Results for County Population Density Change, 1987-1992 
Variable FL  Dummy 
Fl Dummy 
Compliance1 
Fl  Comp1 + 
Education  FL + Compliance2 
Fl + 
Comp2+Education 
EmpDenChange*  1.413966 (5.69)  1.407431 (5.69)  1.253807 ( 4.98)  1.419236 (5.73)    1.245827  (4.91)
EmpDen T-1  .1499449 (5.42)  .1518426 (5.53)  .1355281 (4.87)  .1501776 (5.43)  .1333067 (4.75) 
Amenity  .0003565 (0.07)  .0003435 (0.07)  .0009279 (0.18)  .0003975 (0.08)  .0008993 (0.18) 
Urban  .0419666 (1.53)  .0428333 (1.56)  .0517767 (1.89)  .0417378 (1.52)  .0517057 (1.88) 
Suburban  .016126 (0.69)  .0164149 (0.71)  .0212735 (0.92)  .0159989 (0.69)  .0213691 (0.92) 
Exurban  .0128695 (0.57)  .0130371 (0.58)   '.0166814 (0.74)  .0127941 (0.57)  .0167609 (0.74) 
Expenditure/Pupil -.0050235  (-0.44)  -.0051653 (-0.45)  -.0083319 (-0.73)  -.0048749 (-0.43)  -.0085939 (-0.75) 
GenRevenue/Person .0000113  (0.44)  .0000111 (0.44)  7.41e-06 (0.29)  .0000115 (0.45)  7.02e-06 (0.28) 
DirectExpen/Person  .0000257 (1.30)  .000026 (1.31)      .0000277  (1.40)  .0000257  (1.29) .0000276  (1.40)
TotTax/Person -.1680436  (-1.60)  -.1755686 (-1.67)  -.2150338 (-2.04)  -.1690784 (-1.60)  -.209228 (-1.98) 
PropertyTax/Person  .1594475 (1.45)  .1672344 (1.51)  .2000391 (1.80)  .1600608 (1.45)  .194954 (1.76) 
ViolentCrm/Person 2.347987  (0.73)  2.425807 (0.75)  1.814173 (0.57)  2.339578 (0.73)  1.742198 (0.54) 
PropertyCrm/Person  -.3974438 (-0.67)  -.3888223 (-0.65) -.0471086  (-0.08)  -.3962195  (-0.66) -.0458917  (-0.08) 
Income/Person  .0000116 (2.89)  .0000114 (2.86)  .0000119 (2.98)  .0000116 (2.89)  .000012 (2.99) 
Percent Black  -.1951808 (-0.79)  -.1991148 (-0.81)  -.2523064 (-1.03)  -.1937954 (-0.79) -.2534598  (-1.03) 
Percent White  -.23559 (-0.96)  -.237642 (-0.97)  -.2832875 (-1.16)  -.2341537 (-0.95) -.2856697  (-1.17) 
Pop Den T-1  -.1645833 (-9.09)  -.1665268 (-8.99)  -.1737802 (-9.34)  -.1643961 (-9.11) -.1728813  (-9.51) 
FL*PopDen T-1  .0440958 (4.54)  .0415363 (4.19)  .0290103 (2.77)  .0434301 (3.82)  .0312394 (2.66) 
FL*PopDen T-1*Comply  -  .0095131 (0.75)  .0071638 (0.57)  -  - 
FL*PopDen T-1*Education  -  -  0.040849 (3.30)  -  .0417067 (3.35) 
FL*PopDen T-1*Comply2  -  -  -    .0027474  (0.11)  -.0019053  (-0.08)
R^2 0.7812 0.7815 0.7844 0.7811 0.7839
adj R^2  0.7733 0.7732 0.7757 0.7727 0.7752
N 517 517 517 517 517
          
*Denotes Endogenous Variable         
Percent employment in manufacturing, FIRE, retail, and services are used as instruments.   
 
26   Table 6:  Regression Results for County Employment Density Change, 1987-1992 
Variable  FL Dummy  Fl Dummy Compliance1 
Fl  Comp1 + 
Education  FL + Compliance2 
Fl + 
Comp2+Education 
PopDenChange*   .3605493 (4.01)  .3699133 (4.07)  0.3904178 (3.47)  .3594068 (3.95)  .3725658 (2.73) 
PopDen T-1  -.074683 (-0.34)  -.0231858 (-0.14)  -.1076548 (-0.57)  -.0887424 (-0.39)    -.2232645  (-0.80)
Amenity        -.0022456 (-0.24)     -.0035955 (-0.60) 7.66e-06  (0.00) -.001746 (-0.19)  .0036962 (0.36) 
Urban  .0433561 (0.47)  .0225379 (0.32)  .0584677 (0.74)  .0488765 (0.52)  .1036603 (0.90) 
Suburban  -.0226351 (-0.52)  -.0304833 (-0.97)  -.0133777 (-0.38)  -.0203521 (-0.47)  .0040334 (0.08) 
Exurban  -.0303957 (-1.19)  -.0326525 (-1.52)  -.0265243 (-1.05)  -.0297137 (-1.14)    -.0215068  (-0.63)
Expenditure/Pupil -.0114498  (-1.11)  -.0107475 (-1.12)  -.0122512 (-1.07)  -.0116469 (-1.08)  -.0128021 (-0.86) 
GenRevenue/Person .0000171  (0.33)  .0000247 (0.62)  .0000126 (0.27)  .0000151 (0.29)  -7.27e-06 (-0.11) 
DirectExpen/Person -.0000376  (-1.57)  -.0000359 (-1.75)  -.0000403 (-1.66)  -.0000382 (-1.55)  -.0000448 (-1.36) 
TotTax/Person  .0533564 (0.09)  .1907902 (0.41)  -.0454053 (-0.09)  .0148788 (0.02)    -.3527539  (-0.46)
PropertyTax/Person  -.0658489 (-0.17)  -.1527628 (-0.48)      -.0124536  (-0.03)  -.0417975  (-0.10) .1771115  (0.34)
ViolentCrm/Person -7.238112  (-0.83)  -5.504542 (-0.92)  -8.413037 (-1.24)  -7.735211 (-0.87)  -12.824 (-1.19) 
PropertyCrm/Person      -.2577758  (-0.16)  .0574003  (0.05)  -.6253673 (-0.53)  -.352048 (-0.22) -1.324512  (-0.74)
Income/Person -3.28e-06  (-0.18)  5.44e-07 (0.04)  -8.11e-06 (-0.61)  -4.26e-06 (-0.24)  -.0000156 (-0.81) 
Percent Manufacturing  -.1256996 (-0.89)  -.0939108 (-0.76)      -.1492767  (-1.06)  -.1340412  (-0.90) -.2103895  (-1.11)
Percent FIRE  .2353575 (0.31)  .3706864 (0.73)  .070353 (0.13)  .197487 (0.26)  -.2380146 (-0.28) 
Percent Retail  -.2250486 (-1.09)  -.2506601 (-1.83)  -.2030191 (-1.28)  -.2167319 (-1.06)    -.1158344  (-0.46)
Percent Services  -.0021433 (-0.01)  .0303582 (0.21)  -.0288761 (-0.18)  -.0110064 (-0.06)    -.0996545  (-0.43)
Emp Den T-1  .0590685 (0.55)  .1653027 (0.83)  .1314844 (0.73)  .056046 (0.50)  .0273824 (0.27) 
FL*EmpDen T-1  .008087 (0.44)  .0161626 (0.62)  .0143795 (0.61)  .0094167 (0.51)  .0087584 (0.50) 
FL*EmpDen T-1*Comply  -  .0161626 (0.62)  .051713 (1.14)  -  - 
FL*EmpDen T-1*Education  -  -  -.0114029 (-0.60)  -  -.0158909 (-1.01) 
FL*EmpDen T-1*Comply2  -  -  -  -.0106522 (-0.29)  -.0148512 (-0.42) 
R^2 0.7003 0.755 0.6493 0.6809 0.38
adj R^2  0.6866 0.7432 0.6315 0.6654 0.3485
N 456 456 456 456 456
*Denotes Endogenous Variable.  Percent Black population, percent White population, and number of mulitfamily building permits are used as 
instruments. 
27   Table 7:  Regression Results for County Population Density Change, 1992-1997 
Variable  FL Dummy  Fl Dummy Compliance1 
Fl  Comp1 + 
Education  FL + Compliance2 
Fl + 
Comp2+Education 
EmpDenChange*  1.429924 (11.99)  1.409743 (11.86)  1.353438 (11.27)   1.414042 (11.68)   1.353982 (10.99) 
EmpDen T-1  .2242538 (9.54)  .2303728 (9.77)  .2313389 (9.97)  .2247709 (9.58)  .2317609 (10.04) 
Amenity  -.0095614 (-2.16)  -.0096743 (-2.20)  -.0088945 (-2.06)  -.0095912 (-2.17) -.0089219  (-2.07) 
Urban  .0067853 (0.31)  .007486 (0.34)  .0101857 (0.47)  .0071884 (0.33)  .0102907 ( 0.48) 
Suburban  .0208446 (1.01)  .0199311 (0.97)  .0183987 (0.91)  .020659 (1.00)  .0185735 (0.92) 
Exurban  -.0002771 (-0.01)  -.0010622 (-0.05)  -.0020408 (-0.10)  -.0002124 (-0.01) -.0018394  (-0.09) 
Expenditure/Pupil  .0005557 (0.46)  .000706 (0.59)  .0006526 (0.55)  .0006151 ( 0.51) .0006843  (0.58) 
GenRevenue/Person -.0000716  (-2.55)  -.0000719 (-2.57)  -.0000677 (-2.46)  -.000072 (-2.56)  -.0000681 (-2.47) 
DirectExpen/Person  .0000551 (2.05)  .0000553 (2.07)        .0000502  (1.90) .0000558  (2.07) .0000506  (1.92)
TotTax/Person -.1399696  (-2.19)  -.1516242 (-2.38)  -.1567711 (-2.49)  -.1445612 (-2.26)  -.1588041 (-2.53) 
PropertyTax/Person  .1135317 (1.71)  .1259105 (1.90)        .1294949  (1.98) .1219419  (1.83) .1330642  (2.03)
ViolentCrm/Person -2.733091  (-1.39)  -2.711688 (-1.39)  -2.277076 (-1.19)  -2.866498 (-1.46)  -2.338478 (-1.22) 
PropertyCrm/Person  -.4909514 (-1.11)  -.4416133 (-1.00) -.4158933  (-0.95)  -.4781717  (-1.08) -.414132  (-0.95) 
Income/Person -2.50e-06  (-0.94)  -2.61e-06 (-0.99)  -2.55e-06 (-0.98)  -2.30e-06 (-0.87)  -2.50e-06 (-0.96) 
Percent Black  -.0031197 (-0.17)  -.0059042 (-0.33)  -.0070367 (-0.40)  -.0042984 (-0.24) -.0076632  (-0.44) 
Percent White  .0011462 ( 0.19)  .0021408 (0.36)  .0022664 (0.38)  .0017077 (0.28)  .0025627 (0.43) 
Pop Den T-1  -.2091478 (-13.22)  -.2153285 (-13.16)  -.2212418 (-13.59)  -.210937 (-13.24) -.2216641  (-13.69) 
FL*PopDen T-1  .0408026 (4.30)  .0348773 (3.79)  .0352845 (3.89)  .0356307 (3.58)  .0327577 (3.39) 
FL*PopDen T-1*Comply  -  .0256675 (2.06)        -.0027569  (-0.20) - -
FL*PopDen T-1*Education  -  -  .0719254 (3.67)  -  .0679427 (3.93) 
FL*PopDen  T-1*Comply2          - - -  .0301669 (1.25)     .0118505 (0.50)
         
R^2 0.7578 0.7609 0.7687 0.7591 0.7688
adj R^2  0.7492 0.7519 0.7595 0.75 0.7596
N 524 524 524 524 524
*Denotes Endogenous Variable         
Percent employment in manufacturing, FIRE, retail, and services are used as instruments.     
 
28   Table 8:  Regression Results for County Employment Density Change, 1992-1997 
Variable  FL Dummy  Fl Dummy Compliance1 
Fl  Comp1 + 
Education  FL + Compliance2 
Fl + 
Comp2+Education 
PopDenChange* .5894038  (6.46)  .5863347 (6.04)  .6620122 (4.86)  .5922427 (6.16)  .6739998 (5.06) 
PopDen T-1  -.0598225 (-0.43)  -.1264308 (-0.69)  -.1443448 (-0.79)  -.0842014 (-0.55) -.1038381  (-0.66) 
Amenity  -.0024863 (-0.65)  -.0039707 (-0.82)  -.0037537 (-0.69)  -.0028174 (-0.69) -.0025908  (-0.55) 
Urban  .0278407 (0.71)  .0422173 (0.86)  .049931 (0.99)  .0335188 (0.78)  .0419047 (0.93) 
Suburban  -.0110837 (-0.62)  -.0089249 (-0.42)  -.0064551 (-0.28)  -.0099025 (-0.51) -.0073166  (-0.33) 
Exurban  -.0081685 (-0.49)  -.0090094 (-0.47)  -.0073335 (-0.33)  -.0080318 (-0.46) -.0063119  (-0.31) 
Expenditure/Pupil -.0002319  (-0.24)  -.0000665 (-0.06)  -.0001739 (-0.13)  -.0002042 (-0.20)  -.0003173 (-0.26) 
GenRevenue/Person   4.15e-06  (0.12)  -8.44e-06 (-0.20)  -.0000112 (-0.25)  -4.72e-07 (-0.01)  -3.35e-06 (-0.08) 
DirectExpen/Person  -.000021 (-0.93)  -.000017 (-0.63) -.000018  (-0.59)  -.0000195  (-0.81) -.0000208  (-0.74) 
TotTax/Person -.0438059  (-0.38)  -.0974373 (-0.64)  -.1052739 (-0.68)  -.0632322 (-0.49)  -.0718879 (-0.54) 
PropertyTax/Person  .0561895 (0.44)  .1126761 (0.68)        .1286994  (0.76) .0789917  (0.56) .0954444  (0.65)
ViolentCrm/Person .6775111  (0.43)  .5476979 (0.30)  .9089072 (0.42)  .6125181 (0.36)  1.027038 (0.51) 
PropertyCrm/Person  -.5450334 (-0.59)  -.809544 (-0.74)      -1.092515  (-0.95)  -.679006  (-0.67) -.9793438  (-0.91)
Income/Person -3.64e-06  (-0.65)  -5.70e-06 (-0.82)  -7.51e-06 (-1.04)  -4.32e-06 (-0.72)  -6.32e-06 (-0.98) 
Percent Manufacturing  -.0968645 (-1.57)  -.108326 (-1.47) -.1081419  (-1.30)  -.0983868  (-1.49) -.0985315  (-1.30) 
Percent FIRE  .1024586 (0.25)  -.0018301 (-0.00)  -.1028813 (-0.20)  .0535758 (0.12)    -.0549267  (-0.11)
Percent Retail  .2287338 (0.82)  .32003 (0.95)  .3834467 (1.11)  .2691104 (0.89)  .3378929 (1.07) 
Percent Services  -.1327116 (-1.21)  -.1660139 (-1.24)  -.1948425 (-1.35)  -.1432866 (-1.22) -.1749319  (-1.35) 
Emp Den T-1  .1278918 (0.57)  .2244222 (0.78)  .2697372 (0.94)  .1644735 (0.67)  .2137794 (0.85) 
FL*EmpDen T-1  .025622 (0.68)  .0324169 (0.78)  .0421876 (0.95)  .0269027 (0.71)  .0390204 (0.92) 
FL*EmpDen T-1*Comply  -  .0632466 (1.12)  .0609948 (1.02)  -  - 
FL*EmpDen T-1*Education  -  -  -.0256195 (-0.74)  -  -.0262254  (-0.78) 
FL*EmpDen T-1*Comply2  -  -  -  .0310303 (0.61)  .0169663 (0.28) 
R^2 0.4462 0.2484 0.0365 0.3722 0.1659
adj R^2  0.4237 0.2164 -0.0066 0.3454 0.1286
N 515 515 515 515 515
*Denotes Endogenous Variable, Percent Black population, percent White population, and number of mulitfamily building permits are used 
as instruments. 
29   Table 9:  Summary of Adjustment Parameters, Florida interaction variable 
      1982-
1987 
1987-1992 1992-1997  
Coefficient  Pop            Emp Pop Emp Pop Emp
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30   Table 10:  Summary of Adjustment Parameters, Florida interaction variable and Compliance interaction variable 
        1982-
1987 
1987-1992 1992-1997
Coefficient  Pop            Emp Pop Emp Pop Emp
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31   Table 11:  Summary of Adjustment Parameters, Florida interaction variable, Compliance interaction variable (measured for county), 
and Education element interaction variable 
    1982-
1987 
1987-1992     1992-1997
Coefficient  Pop            Emp Pop Emp Pop Emp






























































       
t-statistics below coefficients in parentheses 
32   Table 12:  Summary of Adjustment Parameters, Florida interaction variable and Compliance interaction variable as percent of county 
population living in complying jurisdictions 
    1982-
1987 
1987-1992     1992-1997
Coefficient  Pop            Emp Pop Emp Pop Emp
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t-statistics below coefficients in parentheses 
 
 
33   Table 13:  Summary of Adjustment Parameters, Florida interaction variable, Compliance interaction variable (as percent of county 
population living in complying jurisdictions) and Education element interaction variable 
        1982-
1987 
1987-1992 1992-1997
Coefficient  Pop            Emp Pop Emp Pop Emp
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34   